Constitutional Law - Federal Occupation of Field of Control of Subversives by Hall, John C., S.Ed.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 53 Issue 2 
1954 
Constitutional Law - Federal Occupation of Field of Control of 
Subversives 
John C. Hall S.Ed. 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Conflict of Laws Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Law and Politics Commons, 
Legislation Commons, National Security Law Commons, and the State and Local Government Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John C. Hall S.Ed., Constitutional Law - Federal Occupation of Field of Control of Subversives, 53 MICH. L. 
REV. 281 (1954). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol53/iss2/10 
 
This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law 
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
1954] RECENT DEcISIONS 281 
CoNSnTUTIONAL I.Aw-FEDERAL 0ccuPATION OF FmLD oF CoNTRoL OF 
StmVBRSIVEs-Defendant was chairman of the Communist Party for the western 
district of Pennsylvania. He was charged with willfully advocating the violent 
overthrow of the United States Government, and his conviction under state 
statute1 was sustained by the superior court. 2 On appeal, held, reversed. The 
federal Smith Act3 pre-empted the field of control of subversive activities and 
the state law is therefore void. Commonwealth 11. Nelson, 3n Pa. 58, 104 A. 
(2d) 133 (1954). 
State laws regulating subversive activities have taken varied forms,4 and 
the attacks have been on many grounds, but absent federal legislation in the 
field, it is clear that a properly drafted state statute regulating subversive activi-
ties is a valid exercise of the state's police power.5 The effect of federal legisla-
tion on the state laws presents a complex problem. There are rulings to the 
effect that the state has an interest in its own existence separate from the national 
1 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1945) tit. 18, §4207. 
2Commonwealth v. Nelson, 172 Pa. Super. 125, 92 A. (2d) 431 (1952). 
s 54 Stat. L. 670 (1940), as amended, 18 U.S.C. (1952) §2385. The Internal Secur-
ity Act, 64 Stat. L. 987 (1950), 50 U.S.C. (1952) §781 et. seq., should not create the 
same problem, as §791 declares that existing criminal laws are not affected. McCarran, 
"The Internal Security Act of 1950," 12 Umv. Prrr. L. RBv. 481 (1951); H. Rep. No. 
2980, 81st Cong., 2d sess., p. 5 (1950). 
4 Groner, "State Control of Subversive Activities in the United States," 9 FED. B.J. 
61 (1947); 28 !ND. L.J. 492 at 495-502 (1953). 
11 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 658, 45 S.Ct. 625 (1925); Whitney v. California, 
274 U.S. 357, 47 S.Ct. 641 (1927). 
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interest that the federal government serves, so that there are, in fact, two 
distinct fields involved. 6 One writer has asserted that the federal government 
may act to protect a state government, short of insurrection, only when the 
state requests aid.7 But in almost all cases, subversive activity aimed at the 
state will affect the nation, and the primary interest of both state and nation is 
in the existence of a central government which is charged with a constitutional 
duty to insure to the states a republican form of government.8 While states 
have argued that their laws on subversives are necessary to prevent riot and 
public violence, the police power should be adequate in the absence of statutes 
controlling subversive activities.9 Assuming that the field of control of federal 
and state laws is the same, two factors must be examined in determining 
whether the federal law is exclusive: (1) existence of a conflict in the applica-
tion of the two laws,1° and (2) the intent of Congress to preclude state law in 
a field in which federal law may be supreme. Courts have generally recognized 
that state laws relating to subversives coincide, rather than conffict, with federal 
law in scope and application;11 the preclusion test must therefore be. applied. An 
earlier test making "coincidence" as fatal as "conflict"12 seems to have given 
way, generally, to an examination of the purposes and policies of the federal 
law and the effect of the state law upon that policy.13 It is in these purposes 
and policies that congressional intent is often found. The courts have two 
lines of authority to follow: Gilbert 17. Minnesota14 and Hines 17. Davidowitz.15 
The former case rules that a state law making interference with the federal 
draft laws a crime was not precluded by the federal statute since it was 
designed to aid enforcement of the national law. The latter case, however, 
held that the federal statute relating to the registration of aliens had pre-empted 
the field in the interests of Congress' exclusive control of foreign affairs. In 
certain areas, then, federal power must be exclusive and state legislation on the 
same subject must fall.16 If Congress intended the Smith Act to establish a 
6 United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 43 S.Ct. 141 (1922); Gilbert v. Minnesota, 
254 U.S. 325, 41 S.Ct. 125 (1920). 
7 Boudin, " 'Seditious Doctrines' and the 'Clear and Present Danger' Rule," 38 VA. 
L. REv. 143, 315 (1952). 
8 U.S. CoNsT., art. IV, §4. See People v. Lloyd, 304 ill. 23, 136 N.E. 505 (1922). 
9 Gilbert v. Minnesota, note 6 supra; People v. Immonen, 271 Mich. 384, 261 N.W. 
59 (1935). 
10 Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. (63 U.S.) 227 (1859); 60 HARv. L. REv. 262 
(1946). 
11 State v. Holm, 139 Minn. 267, 166 N.W. 181 (1918); Gilbert v. Minnesota, note 
6 supra. 
12 Charleston & W. C. R. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 35 S.Ct. 715 
(1915). 
13 California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 69 S.Ct. 841 (1949); Cloverleaf Co. v. Patterson, 
315 U.S. 148, 62 S.Ct. 491 (1942). 
14 254 U.S. 325, 41 S.Ct. 125 (1920). 
15 312 U.S. 52, 61 S.Ct. 399 (1941). 
16 E.g. immigration and naturalization, foreign affairs; Hines v. Davidson, note 15 
supra. 
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uniform program, state laws are void.17 But Congress was aware of the exist-
ing state statutes.18 It can be argued that under such circumstances an intent 
to invalidate state laws would have been more clearly expressed.19 The author 
of the Smith Act has stated that he did not intend the law to be exclusive.20 
The principal case suggests that the federal law is paramount, however, and 
there are indications that this holding may be correct. To the extent that sub-
versives are aliens, there may be international complications in the enforcement 
of state laws. State authorities do not have access to the federal files, and 
might seriously hamper a nationwide system of investigation by their arrests.21 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has shown growing tolerance for 
state statutes. The fact that the states have traditionally exercised police 
powers in a particular field has been persuasive in arguing that a federal statute 
has not pre-empted that field.22 The withdrawal of a power so long and so 
extensively exercised by state should be based on a clearer showing of congress-
ional policy than was available in the principal case. It is difficult to say that 
the state subversive statutes stand in the way of "the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,"23 and if uniformity 
isn't essential, the states should retain the power to act.24 The rule of the 
Gilbert case appears the better one, allowing both state and nation to prosecute 
subversives under otherwise valid laws. 
John C. Hall, S.Ed. 
1'1Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 10 S.Ct. 681 (1890); California v. Zook, note 13 
supra. 
1s S. Rep. No. 1358, 81st Cong., 2d sess., p. 9 (1950) 
19 Cloverleaf Co. v. Patterson, note 13 supra; Sinnot v. Davenport, note 10 supra. 
20 Principal case at 89-90. 
21 E.g., arrest of an FBI "plant" in a local party cell. See Hoover, "Civil Liberties and 
Law Enforcement: The Role of the F.B.I.," 37 lowA L. REv. 175 (1952). State criminal 
laws against communists might make federal registration more difficult. Communist Party 
membership, per se, is not yet a federal crime. 
22 California v. Zook, note 13 supra. 
23 Hines v. Davidson, note 15 supra, at 67. 
24 California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 61 S.Ct. 930 (1942). 
